

REINHARD GEHLEN

A General Staff officer who under Halder headed *Fremde Heere Ost*, the intelligence department of the General Staff on the eastern front. He emerged in the postwar era as president of the BND, Germany's first intelligence service.

Reinhard Gehlen Dies, Spy for Hitler, U.S., Bonn

By Jean R. Hailey

Washington Post Staff Writer

Gen. Reinhard Gehlen, 77, Hitler's chief anti-Soviet spy in World War II who later became a Soviet expert for the United States and the first head of West Germany's secret service, died Friday at his home near Munich.

The death was reported by relatives, according to Reuter, which said he had cancer of the prostate gland and had been released from a hospital three months ago.

Gen. Gehlen was head of West Germany's "Bundesnachrichtendienst" (BND) from the time the secret service was officially recognized in 1956 until he retired in 1968.

He had set up its forerunner, known as the "Gehlen Organization," at the request of the U.S. occupation forces in Europe after World War II.

It has been estimated that he and the thousands whom he employed in his counterespionage organization provided this country's Central Intelligence Agency and the Pentagon with 70 percent of its intelligence on the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe.

Gen. Gehlen was born at Erfurt (now in East Germany), the son of a publishing house director. He joined the German army in 1920 and served as a cavalry and artillery officer. Following Hitler's rise to power, Gen. Gehlen was given secret service training and became an officer on the general staff. He was considered brilliant at desk work.

He continued to move up as he participated in the invasion of Poland and the sweep across France. Then in 1942 he became head of Nazi intelligence for the Eastern Front.

But Gen. Gehlen ran into head-on opposition from Hitler when he organized a Russian Army of Liberation from among anti-Communist prisoners of war and partisans who had been captured in the German invasion of the U.S.S.R. He soon fell into disfavor.

He remained loyal, however, to Hitler until he began to see the approach of the end of the war. He saved his massive secret service files on the Russians by hiding them in steel cases in Bavaria.

After he surrendered to the American forces, he negotiated a deal with this country to establish a secret intelligence service for the occupation forces.

It had been apparent to the Americans that they were totally unprepared when it came to intelligence about the Soviets. Gen. Gehlen was given autonomous command over a personally chosen German staff to organize cold-war espionage in the Soviet zone for this country.

It is estimated that he hired between 4,000 and 20,000 people to work for him. Many of them were ex-Nazis.



REINHARD GEHLEN

He was financed with millions of U.S. dollars.

West German chancellor Konrad Adenauer reportedly had much confidence in Gen. Gehlen's skills, and he was given comparatively free rein after his organization became official.

But West German newspapers criticized the mystery with which the so-called "faceless general" operated. In 1961, he suffered a setback when it was discovered that his chief of counterintelligence, Heinz Felfe, was a Soviet double agent.

Gen. Gehlen's influence and reputation further waned after the death of Adenauer in 1967. His critics attacked his strong anti-Soviet views as outdated, and he retired a year later.

Gen. Gehlen married the former Herta von Seydlitz-Kurzbach and they had four children.

Since retirement, he had lived near Starnberg Lake in Bavaria and spent most of his time involved with the Evangelical (Protestant) Church.

Alice Koyama, Science

Alice F. Trauth Koyama, 60, a retired employe relations assistant in the personnel office of the National Academy of Sciences, died of cancer Friday at Northern Virginia Doctors Hospital.

She had joined the academy in 1969, and retired in 1977 after undergoing lung surgery.

Mrs. Koyama was born in Cincinnati. She graduated from the Bethesda Hospital nursing school there and later received a degree in business administration from the University of Cincinnati. She was a retired nurse.



Sven Simon fotografierte Geheimdienstchef Reinhard Gehlen und seine Ehefrau Herta 1977 auf dem Sofa ihres Hauses am Starnberger See.

„Verschlußsache“ des Toten

● Bundeskanzler Helmut Schmidt, gegen den 1962 in der „Spiegel-Affäre“ von der Bundesanwaltschaft ermittelt worden war.

● Ex-Bundeskanzler Willy Brandt, der 1974 über den „DDR“-Spion Günter Guillaume stürzte, Guillaume war sein Referent gewesen. Gehlen fragt: „Wo sitzen die anderen, wirksameren, hochplacierten Agenten westdeutscher Staatsangehörigkeit?“

● Der stellvertretende Vorsitzende der SPD-Fraktion, Horst Ehmke, der als Minister im Bundeskanzleramt von 1969 bis 1972 politischer Vorsitzender des BND war und die Parole ausgab, „den Mythos Gehlen zu knacken“.

● SPD-Bundesgeschäftsführer Egon Bahr, der die Ostverträge aushandelte und den Gehlen nach einem Besuch in der BND-Zentrale in Pullach bei München observieren ließ.

● Der verstorbene Bundespräsident Gustav Heinemann, dessen Gesamtdeutsche Volkspartei in den 50er Jahren ein Wahlbündnis mit dem „Bund der Deutschen“ einging und in den Verdacht geriet, von Kommunisten unterwandert, mitfinanziert und ferngesteuert zu werden.

Unter Reinhard Gehlen, der im Zweiten Weltkrieg in der Wehrmacht Chef der Feindaufklärung „Fremde Heere Ost“ gewesen war, wurde der Bundesnachrichtendienst in seiner Glanzzeit zum erfolgreichsten Geheimdienst der Welt.

Gehlen war „der Spion des Jahrhunderts“ (so sein englischer Biograph E. H. Coochridge). Seine Informationen bestimmten entscheidend die Rußland-Politik Amerikas. Adenauer vertraute ihm blind. Ein stellvertretender Ministerpräsident der „DDR“ gehörte zu seinen Agenten.

Der BND sagte den Bau der Mauer, den Überfall auf die CSSR und den Beginn des 6-Tage-Krieges exakt voraus.

Gehlen's Organisation war ein verschworener Orden. Ein Offizierskamerad bezeichnete ihn „als Produkt einer Schäferstunde zwischen Mata Hari und Ludendorff“. CIA-Chef Allan W. Dulles urteilte über ihn: „Er hat das Hirn eines Professors, das Herz eines Soldaten, die Witte-

lung eines Wolfes.“ Die Sowjets nannten ihn „der Hexer“.

Gehlen's Glaubensbekenntnis lautete: „Ich betrachte den Kommunismus als eine tödliche Gefahr und lehne sein Gedankengebäude vollkommen ab.“


Diese Kalte-Kriegs-Haltung ließ den General gegen Ende seiner Karriere (Pensionierung: 1968) immer mehr vereinsamen.

Sein letztes Werk, die „Verschlußsache“, wußte Gehlen als Geheimnis wohl zu hüten. Selbst seine Familie — seine Frau Herta und seine Söhne — erfuhren von dem Erscheinen des Nachlasses erst, als der Verlag — bei dem Gehlen sein Manuskript deponiert hatte — die Veröffentlichung diese Woche ankündigte.

Bonn fiel aus allen Urlaubswolken.

Der Nachlaß des vor einem Jahr verstorbenen Geheimdienstchefs Reinhard Gehlen hat Bonn aus dem sommerlichen Ferienschlaf geweckt.

Denn in dem Manuskript, das jetzt veröffentlicht wird, treten Akteure auf, die heute noch die Politik der Republik bestimmen – von Brandt bis Schmidt.



Sven Simon fotografierte Geheimdienstchef Reinhard Gehlen und seine Ehefrau Herta 1971

Die „Verschlußsache“ d

A. K. Bonn
Ein Gespenst geht um in Bonn. Ein Toter hat die Hauptstadt aus ihrem sommerlichen Ferienschlaf geweckt: General Reinhard Gehlen, der legendäre Gründer und Chef des Bundesnachrichtendienstes BND.

Als der kleine große Mann mit der Reiterfigur und der Charles-Bronson-Oberlippe am 8. Juni 1979 starb, hinterließ er ein in enger, steiler Schrift geschriebenes Manuskript. Ein Jahr nach seinem Tode sollte es veröffentlicht werden. Jetzt ist es soweit. Unter dem Titel „Verschlußsache“ wird es im v. Hase-Koehler-Verlag erscheinen.

Unter den Schlüsselfiguren der „Verschlußsache“ sind tote und lebendige Spitzenpolitiker der Bundesrepublik:

● Bundeskanzler Helmut Schmidt, gegen den 1962 in der „Spiegel-Affäre“ von der Bundesanwaltschaft ermittelt worden war.

● Ex-Bundeskanzler Willy Brandt, der 1974 über den „DDR“-Spion Günter Guillaume stürzte, Guillaume war sein Referent gewesen. Gehlen fragt: „Wo sitzen die anderen, wirksameren, hochplacierten Agenten westdeutscher Staatsangehörigkeit?“

● Der stellvertretende Vorsitzende der SPD-Fraktion, Horst Ehmke, der als Minister im Bundeskanzleramt von 1969 bis 1972 politischer Vorsitzender des BND war und die Parole ausgab, „den Mythos Gehlen zu knacken“.

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● Der verstorbene Bundespräsident Gustav Heinemann, dessen Gesamtdeutsche Volkspartei in den 50er Jahren ein Wahlbündnis mit dem „Bund der Deutschen“ einging und in den Verdacht geriet, von Kommunisten unterwandert, mitfinanziert und ferngesteuert zu werden.

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Gehlen war „der Jahrhundertmann“ (so der Biograph Egon Bahr). Seine Informationen entschieden über die Politik Amerikas. Er traute ihm blind. Der DDR-Minister für Außenbeziehungen, Otto Grottel, gehörte zu den „Gehlen-Organen“.

Der BND sagte Mauer, den Überwachern der CSSR und den Besatzungsmächten des Zweiten Weltkrieges exakt, was sie wollten.

Gehlen war ein verschwiegener Organisationskünstler, ein „als Produkt einer Zusammenarbeit zwischen Mata Hari und dem CIA“ bezeichnetes Wesen. Er urteilte über das Hirn eines Soldaten.



Milestones in My Career

April 3, 1902

Born in Erfurt, Germany. Parents: Lieutenant Colonel (ret.) Walther Gehlen, publisher, of Breslau, and Katharina Margarete, *née* von Vaernewyck.

April 1, 1920

Completed secondary education.

April 20, 1920

Joined the provisional Reichswehr.

Summer 1921

Officer candidate, Third Artillery Regiment.

Autumn 1922

Ensign.

Autumn 1923

Ensign first class.

December 1, 1923

Promoted to lieutenant.

February 1, 1928

First lieutenant; until early 1933, adjutant of First Detachment, Third Artillery Regiment.

October 1, 1933

Staff college until 1935.

May 1, 1934

Promoted to captain.

July 1935

Posted to General Staff. Served in various positions, including adjutant to deputy chief of staff and simultaneously in the operations branch and in the fortifications branch of the General Staff.

[379

380] MILESTONES IN MY CAREER

November 10, 1938 Commander, Eighth Battery, Eighteenth Artillery Regiment.

March 1, 1939

Promoted to major.

September 1, 1939

Upon outbreak of war, operations officer (Ia) of 213th Infantry Division, until October 6, 1939.

October 10, 1939

Chief of Fortifications Group of War Department, until May 1940.

May 1940

In succession, liaison officer to Commander in Chief Brauchitsch of the Sixteenth Army, to General Hoth's panzer group, and to General Guderian's panzer group, until the end of the campaign in France, June 1940.

July 1, 1940

Adjutant of General Haider, chief of the General Staff, until October 1940.

October 7, 1940

Chief of Eastern Group of General Staff's operations branch.

July 1, 1941

Promoted to lieutenant colonel (GS).

April 1, 1942

Appointed head of General Staff's branch, Foreign Armies East.

December 1, 1942

Promoted to colonel (GS).

December 1, 1944

Promoted to brigadier general.

April 9, 1945

Dismissed as head of Foreign Armies East.

May 22, 1945

Surrendered with my principal colleagues to American forces at Fischhausen, on Lake Schliessee.

August 26, 1945

Flown to United States with four of my colleagues.

July 1, 1946

Departure from United States for Europe.

July 12, 1946

Discharged from prisoner of war status. Formal birth of the Gehlen organization.

April 1, 1956

Transfer of Gehlen organization to West German government; birth of Federal Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst). Promoted to lieutenant general of reserve in the Bundeswehr. President of the BND.

April 30, 1968

Retirement from Federal Intelligence Service.

September 10, 1931

Married to Herta Gehlen, *née* von Seydlitz-Kurzbach.

23. Juni 1955

Sehr verehrter Herr Dr. Globke!

Wie ich hier unter der Hand gehört habe, sind zwischen CIA und der Army schon seit längerer Zeit erhebliche Spannungen wegen der Frage eines künftigen deutschen Nachrichtendienstes, wobei die Army daran interessiert ist, daß im Rahmen des künftigen Verteidigungsministeriums ein Instrument besteht, zu dem sie eine gute Verbindung hat. Zum Teil sind diese Dinge, ebenso wie der Schritt des Generals Trudeau gelegentlich der Anwesenheit des Herrn Bundeskanzlers in den Staaten, auf die höchst eigenartige Persönlichkeit dieses Generals, den ich persönlich nicht kenne, zurückzuführen. Wie ich zuverlässig erfahren habe, wird jetzt in Heidelberg bei den dortigen Armee-Amerikanern ein Vorschlag für einen Sicherheitsdienst des deutschen Verteidigungsministeriums ausgearbeitet, der angeblich weit über die tatsächlichen Bedürfnisse hinausgehen soll. Es besteht ja kein Zweifel daran, dass ein zuverlässiges Instrument dieser Art vorhanden sein muss. Ein Mammutinstrument über die tatsächlichen Bedürfnisse hinaus - und das gilt ebenso für den künftigen Bundesnachrichtendienst - ist immer von Übel und erhöht nicht, sondern verringert die Leistungsfähigkeit. Ich habe diese Informationen von amerikanischer Seite erhalten und möchte Sie bitten, sie ganz vertraulich zu behandeln, fühlte mich jedoch verpflichtet, Sie persönlich darüber zu unterrichten.

Mit den besten Grüßen und Empfehlungen bin ich

stets Ihr ergebener

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~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

STR 21/53

9 March 1953

Reinhard GEHLEN

Background information:

a. Entered military service in April 1920 as an officer candidate with the 3rd Prussian Artillery Regiment in FRANKFURT/Oder.

b. Commissioned on 1 December 1923,
Promoted to 1st Lt on 1 February 1928,
Captain on 1 May 1934
Major in General Staff on 1 August 1936
Lt Col in General Staff on 1 August 1941
Colonel in General Staff on 1 April 1942
Brig. General on 1 December 1944

c. From 1929 until 1932: 1st Adjutant in Artillery Regiment # 3, SCHWEIDNITZ Detachment (I. Detachment of Artillery Regiment # 3 stationed in SCHWEIDNITZ, II Detachment and Regimental Staff stationed in FRANKFURT/Oder). From 1933 until 1935: attendance of War College, subsequently assigned to General Staff on trial basis. Permanently appointed as General Staff officer with promotion to major. From 1937 until 1938: worked in General Staff section "Foreign Armies East" (Fremde Heere Ost). There he met and collaborated with Friedrich Wilhelm HEINZ, who had been transferred into the Ground Forces as a police officer on 1 February 1931. HEINZ had entered the police service in 1926, was promoted to 1st Lt while serving with Infantry Regiment # 102 in CHEMNITZ, and to captain on 1 October 1937. He was at that time attending war college in BERLIN. He became a major and permanent General Staff officer on 1 February 1941, a Lt Col on 1 May 1943 and a colonel on 1 February 1945.

d. GEHLEN's intelligence gathering experiences are solely based on his staff work with the section "Foreign Armies East." Since he was considered an expert in that field he was retained for exploitation by US Forces after World War II. He was clever enough to realize his position and its importance to expand it into a vast organization of information gatherers. In this endeavor he is today handicapped wherever possible by his former compatriot HEINZ, who felt slighted for not being included in GEHLEN's organization. HEINZ, who has been a covert military advisor to the Federal Chancellor since 1949/50, has formed an alliance with Achim OSTER, counterintelligence chief of the ELANK Office, which tends to discredit and disqualify GEHLEN with federal authorities. These tendencies are at present, however, no more than a constant pressure with very little chance of success because of the confidence and support which GEHLEN enjoys from GUMPEL and GLOEKE in the Federal Chancellery. A constant contact is maintained by GEHLEN to these two officials either by himself or by his aide, von LOSSOW. Their reports are forwarded in the manner of personal correspondence, on plain stationery without letterhead and through courier only. In return GEHLEN is receiving continuous

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REINHARD GEHLEN

9 Mar. 53

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~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~

financial contributions from a special fund through GUMPEL. The headquarters of GEHLEN is presently located in MUNICH, Senefelderstrasse 8. He is married to a von SEYDLITZ as of the beginning of World War II.

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Feb 1953

File

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JOINT MESSAGEFORM	
<p>ROUTING</p> <p style="font-size: 1.2em; margin-top: 20px;">9</p> <p style="margin-top: 10px;">F. 627</p> <p style="margin-top: 10px;">101530Z</p> <p>FROM: (Originator) CO 66th CIC GROUP BAD CANNSTATT</p> <p>TO: CIC LO HEIDELBERG</p> <p>INFO: OPNL FOR COLLECTION SECTION FROM LEYBOURNE</p> <p style="text-align: center; margin-top: 20px;">PARAGRAPH NOT REQUIRED CONTIN</p> <p>WE HAVE AN URGENT NEED FOR AVAL MIL INFO ON FORMER GENERAL-MAJOR REINHARD GEHLEN CMM GERMAN HEAD OF SUGAR DOG FASY PROJECT CMM IN ORDER TO BRIEF GENERALS BOLTE AND GAVIN PD CENTRAL REGISTRY CONTAINS ONLY SCANTY INFO PD DOG ABLE DOG LIAISON OFFICER THIS HQ HAS BEEN REQUESTED FOR INFO AVAL TO HIS AGENCY AND OUR SOURCES HAVING ACCESS TO MIL RECORDS HAVE BEEN QUERIED PD SINCE GEHLEN WAS UNITED STATES PRISONER OF WAR IT IS LIKELY THAT HIS TWO ZERO ONE FILE IS IN WASHINGTON IN REQUEST THAT APPROPRIATE DEPARTMENT OF ARMY AGENCY BE CABLED FOR THIS FILE PD</p>	<p>DATE-TIME GROUP 101530Z Feb 1953</p> <p>PRECEDENCE FOR: Routine</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> BOOK MESSAGE <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> ORIGINAL MESSAGE</p> <p><input type="checkbox"/> MULTIPLE ADDRESS <input type="checkbox"/> YES <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> NO</p> <p>CRYPTOCIPHER/CAUTION</p> <p>REFERS TO MESSAGE</p> <p>IDENTIFICATION</p> <p>CLASSIFICATION</p>
<p>DRIVER'S NAME (and signature, when required) Lt LEYBOURNE <i>[Signature]</i></p> <p>SYMBOL: CICOP TELEPHONE: 284</p>	
<p>RELEASING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE <i>[Signature]</i> PATRICK J. GALLAGHER, JR. MAJOR</p> <p>OFFICIAL TITLE Chief, Ops Section</p>	

DD FORM 1 OCT 49 173 REPLACES FORM 173, 1 MAY 49 WHICH MAY BE USED. AGL (1) 9-52-50004-7700

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Auth Para 1-603 DoD 5200. 1-R

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5 OCT 54

GEHLEN, Reinhard

8 OCT 1954

NOETH

claimed source of information about dismissal of SUBJECT as GEHLEN personally and Anton GRILLERENGER.

Ref: DL-19496, TWX RGN IV dtd 5 Oct 54, D-1525
Subj: Karl KUM2

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CS-MARK

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GEHLENDY

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Date: 3/15/43
Ref Date 6/29/45
GEHLEN

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INCOMING CABLE
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FROM: SHAWT HAIN
TO: G-3, GOM 2, 12TH ARMY GROUP
DATE: 0315408
REF NO: 8-95098

EX 63028 OF 29 JUNE 1945 FROM PROSEA HAIN TO 12TH ARMY GROUP AND
SHAWT HAIN FILES. (GEHLEN) DESIGNED BY WAR DEPARTMENT AFTER THEATRE

INTERCOMMITTEE.

GEHLEN, Reinhard Gen Mng. Ic & ash. 9 unit
27 May, 1945, 1st Tbird 9 unit
17 June, 1945, 1st Tbird 9 unit
21 Aug, 1945, 1st Tbird 9 unit

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BY DEP CDR UJAINSCOM FOIPO
Auth Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1-R

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TO: COM 66TH CIG GP
FROM: HQ OCA
MEHELM (3) 30

What is CR

OCT 57

G VISIT TO
CR

INCOMING MESSAGE FORM		CLASSIFICATION	
TO: 311914Z OCT 57	FROM: 311342Z	DECLERK	
FROM: LO OCA MEHELM	PRIORITY: R	REFERENCE NR: 0-3471	
AC-PAPAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED EXCEPT PRIOR TO CATEGORY A ENCRYPTION-PHYSICALLY REMOVE ALL INTERNAL REFERENCES BY DATE-TIME GROUP PRIOR TO DECLASSIFICATION. IF UNCLASSIFIED REFERENCE IF THE DATE-TIME GROUP IS QUOTED.			
FM AEUC-LY08 FOR AEUC-SCOS(LN BR).			
SUBJ IS CONTEMPLATED VISIT OF GEN GEHLEN OF THE FRG FED INTEL SVC TO GR.			
REF TELECOM MAJ MITCHELL/MR HUGHES, MR PLEASANTS, OCA BONN, HAS ADVISED LY08 THAT GEN GEHLEN SPEAKS AND UNDERSTANDS ENGLISH FLUENTLY. PLEASANTS NOT AWARE OF LEVEL OF CLASSIFICATION FOR WHICH GEHLEN CLEARED FOR ACCESS TO US CLAS MTL INFO BUT IS CHECKING. UPON REC OF INFO WILL IMMEDIATELY NOTIFY YOUR HQ.			
BV 57-5131			
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CLASSIFICATION		REMARKS	
PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES		COPY 1 OF 2 COPIES	

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AEUC FORM 173(L)
28 NOV 56

PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS FORM ARE OBSOLETE.

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UNCLASSIFIED
ON 28 SEP 1982
BY DEP CDR USAINSCOM FOIPO
Auth Pa. 1-603 DOD 5200.1-R

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66TH CIG GP

APR 57

G RETURNED
ORIENTATION
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REPORT			
INFO FROM AEW-LNOB FOR ATTC-5005			
INFO AEUC-SPLD.			

2-3

END PRESIDENT GEPLEN RETURNED FROM ORIENTATION VISIT TO US
THE OTHER DAY. GEPLEN ACCOMPANIED BY SEVERAL BMD OFFCLS. FOR
YOUR INFO.

BV-57-1732.

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ON 23 SEP 1982
BY DEP CDR USAINSCOM FOIPO
Auth Para 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R

CLASSIFICATION

FORM 100-173 (2)
24 NOV 56

0229

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MILESTONES IN MY CAREER

X November 10, 1938 Commander, Eighth Battery, Eighteenth Artillery Regiment

March 1, 1939 Promoted to major

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October 10, 1939 Chief of Fortifications Group of War Department, until May 1940

May 1940

In succession, liaison officer to Commander in Chief Branch of the Sixteenth Army, to General Hecks group, and to General Guderian's panzer group, until the end of the campaign in France, June 1940.

Adjutant of General Halder, chief of the General Staff, until October 1940.

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July 1, 1941

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April 9, 1945

May 22, 1945

Dismissed as head of Foreign Armies East. Surrendered with my principal colleagues to American forces at Weissenau, on Lake Schliersee. Flown to United States with four of my colleagues. Departure from United States for Europe.

July 12, 1946

Discharged from prisoner of war status. Formal birth of the Gehlen organization.

April 1, 1956

Transfer of Gehlen organization to West German government, with Federal Intelligence Service (Bundesnachrichtendienst). Promoted to lieutenant general of war in the Bundeswehr. President of the BND.

April 30, 1968

Retirement from Federal Intelligence Service.

September 10, 1931

Married to Herta Gehlen, née von Seydewitz-Kunzbach.



GLOSSARY

Gehlen

Bio

Abwehr

The intelligence service controlled by the German OKW (q.v.) until 1944, when it was disbanded.

BfV

Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz, "Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution," the approximate equivalent of the FBI or of the Special Branch in Britain. Founded in 1950, it is the investigatory agency handling West German counterespionage and countersubversion activities—without, however, any executive powers (i.e., of arrest). It is subordinated to the Ministry of the Interior.

Blank Office

Amt Blank, the West German government agency set up in 1950 as the forerunner of the Ministry of Defense.

BND

Bundesnachrichtendienst, "Federal Intelligence Service," the successor to the Gehlen organization, which it absorbed upon its creation in April 1956. It was headed by Reinhard Gehlen from then until

Gehlen



Milestones in My Career

April 3, 1902

Born in Erfurt, Germany. Parents: Lieutenant Colonel (ret.) Walther Gehlen, publisher, of Breslau, and Katharina Margarete, *née* von Vaernewyck.

April 1, 1920

Completed secondary education.

April 20, 1920

Joined the provisional Reichswehr.

Summer 1921

Officer candidate, Third Artillery Regiment.

Autumn 1922

Ensign.

Autumn 1923

Ensign first class.

December 1, 1923

Promoted to lieutenant.

February 1, 1928

First lieutenant; until early 1933, adjutant of First Detachment, Third Artillery Regiment.

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Staff college until 1935.

May 1, 1934

Promoted to captain. ★

July 1935 ★

Posted to General Staff. Served in various positions, including adjutant to deputy chief of staff and simultaneously in the operations branch and in the fortifications branch of the General Staff.

ADD3E

The Gehlen legacy

ITEM AVAGE. EMT. ON PAR: II 1960

Rainhard Gehlen must be credited with having given the Germany that evolved out of World War II, a well conceived national intelligence service reporting directly to the head of state, under oversight of the elected parliament, responsive to the intelligence requirements of all elements of the German government. The service he created was not, like those of the Third Reich, an instrument of a political party; nor was it subordinated to one of more military services -- a solution that in the United States contributed directly to the intelligence failure at Pearl Harbor. The function of the intelligence service was entirely separated from that of Germany's internal security service, the BfV. and had more of the character of the American National Security Agency. The service was entirely separated from that of Germany's internal security service, the BfV. and had more of the character of the American National Security Agency.

A unique element in the history of German intelligence was the historical fact that the first Inspector General of the Bundeswehr, General Adolf Husinger had, because of intimate familiarity from 1942 to July 1944, a first hand knowledge of the wartime proficiency of Fremde Herre Ost, the Army General Staff Intelligence Department that each day provided the intelligence information that was integrated into the operational briefing delivered to higher authority by the Army Chief of Staff and his principal operations staff

review

ADD 3E

Legacy

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officer, Adolf Heusinger. For three years between early 1948 and early 1951, Adolf Heusinger was the actual functioning head of the Evaluation Staff of the Gehlen Organization, the direct successor to Fremde Heere Ost.

This long association in dealing with intelligence matters was, in the case of Gehlen and Heusinger unique. The resemblance of Gerhard Wessel; on this relationship to the

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This intelligence structure in the new German government was not in any sense a carbon copy of the new Central Intelligence Agency in the United States. ^{ut} But it cannot be denied that from 1948 to 1956, had experienced a close and expanding relationship with CIA. Both CIA and the BND reflected an understanding of the enormous technological revolution that had altered the world, including the character of war, communication, transportation and the business of intelligence itself.

That Reinhard Gehlen was the central force in conceptualizing and creating this modern German intelligence service is without doubt his principal legacy to the German nation that is, at the end of this century, a close and powerful ally of the United States within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

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I think it is fair to say that Gehlen left this impression as a legacy in spite of qualities in his personality and character that at times seemed to threaten the attainment of his objective. Gehlen was a product of the Army General Staff of the Beck and Halder eras. He was an intelligence man but not a man of unusual intellectual talents. He was a Christian and moral man but one who lacked the principled integrity and wisdom of Heusinger. I do not think that Gehlen ever found it necessary to squarely face the moral and legal issues of the German Resistance; instead he sidestepped them but in 1943 at the

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Gehlen { I think Gehlen was a nationalist who believed in a future German nation^s state recovering its strengths within the old system of European nation states, albeit moving toward ^{a vague idea} ~~some~~ kind of United States of Western Europe. I never observed that Gehlen with any conviction joined Heusinger, Speidel and Foertsch in their conviction that the only viable future for Europe lay in an Atlantic alliance led by the United States of America. I think Gehlen was and remained a Gaullist and was ^{quite} ~~quite~~ prepared to live with a Western

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Europe built around the French, German and Italian Catholic majority that until 1950 was Adenauer's geopolitical goal. This did not mean that Gehlen's idea of a future United Europe would not, strategically come under an essential protective canopy of ~~THE~~ ^{US} as a great power facing Communist Soviet Union.

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In the eight years that I was closely associated with him, Reinhard Gehlen never identified and gave broad responsibility to him. During the war, both Heere and Wessel had served for some time as Gehlen's deputy in Fremde Heere Ost. After Heere joined Gehlen in Fort Hunt in early 1946 he became Gehlen's closest and most influential alter ego. Regardless of his job description at any time in those eight years in Pullach, Heere was the ever present figure at Gehlen's side. Certainly on anything relating to relations

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Gerhard Wessel cooperated fully in standing down to provide Heusinger the logical position as head of the Evaluation Staff. But Wessel was very aloof and made no pretense of being close to Gehlen. He was, however, recognized by all as one of the inner circle. I never saw Wessel attempt to assert a role in managing any other part of the organization. He seemed entirely aloof from Gehlen's political maneuvering in Bonn.

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In the first year, CIA identified Gehlen CI organization in Karlsruhe and the separate group in Austria as major problems requiring a great deal of management attention. Gehlen, sensing that both of these organizations had vulnerabilities in need of serious attention. Gehlen had neither the time nor the interest in dealing with these but refused to delegate authority to his associates to address these. By early 1950 Gehlen was overwhelmed by problems of a developing relationship with Bonn, with some the Eastern European intelligence services and with the great number of operations in which he involved himself -- the so called "Doktor Operations. On 1 April Gehlen convened a major staff meeting at which most of his senior associates, including Heusinger, were present. O

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To me, the most tragic side of the Gehlen story is that he died a controversial figure among many of those who had worked longest and closest with him. Indeed, his greatest supporter in the critical 1950s, ^{he} Konrad Adenauer, broke with Gehlen over the "Seeger Affair" on which Gehlen allowed to have been decided; he overruled the German defense [policy]. In fact, Adenauer's career faltered and ended in the aftermath of the "Siegel Affair." But more tragic to me was the pattern of dissolution which in the end separated so many of Gehlen's earliest and most loyal supporters from him in subsequent years. Heere, Kuerhlein and Wendland, to name just three, withdrew from long and close association with him. But there were many others, including notably Eberhard Blaum, who was almost of the next generation and not out of the Mauterwald era, who remained among Gehlen's defenders. But Blum, of course, took refuge as the BND representative in Washington where he remained for twelve years until recalled in 1978 to replace Wessel as President of the BND. Gerhard Wessel pursued a career in which he remained loyal but aloof. In my early years in Pullach I observed that Wessel was very much his own man, quietly working loyally and closely with Heusinger on the Eva;itaopm Staff from 1948 until Heusinger's gradual withdrawal after becoming Adenauer's military advisor starting ^{at the end of} in 1950. In 1962 Wessel moved to Paris to join Hans Speidel and never returned to the Gehlen Organization or the BND ^{until} in 1968 when he ended

Eberhard Blum

Im Juli 1991

REINHARD GEHLEN - Ein Portrait

E. BLUM
Portrait of
Gehlen

REINHARD GEHLEN - Ein Portrait

Reinhard Gehlen, Persönlichkeit der Zeitgeschichte, hat die Phantasie seiner Zeitgenossen beschäftigt. In Büchern über Spionage wird er stets, über die Nachkriegsentwicklung häufig genannt; einige Schriftsteller beschäftigen sich ausführlich mit ihm und seinem Werk. Jüngst hat eine amerikanische Historikerin ein gut recheriertes Buch über die Beziehung der Amerikaner - Army und CIA - zu Gehlen und über die Entstehungsgeschichte seiner Organisation verfasst.

In diesen Publikationen bemüht man sich um eine Charakterisierung seiner Persönlichkeit - meist mit geringem Erfolg; zur Mystifizierung hat er selbst viel beigetragen, was ein objektives Bild erschwert.

Kein Wunder, dass die Darstellung im Zuge kontroverser und zum Teil revisionistischer Betrachtung der jüngsten Geschichte meist verzerrt ist.

Mehrfach dazu gedrängt, aber auch im Bestreben zu einem objektiven Bild beizutragen - aus subjektiver Sicht naturgemäss, aber jedenfalls aus langjähriger persönlicher Kenntnis und vertrautem Umgang - will ich im folgenden meine Sicht, meine Eindrücke, mein Urteil darlegen:

Die Unauffälligkeit in Auftreten und Erscheinung kommt seinem Bedürfnis nach Anonymität zustatten: mittelgross, mittelgewichtig, aber elastisch und lebhaft in seinen Bewegungen - ich sehe ihn die breiten Treppen des "Doktor-Hauses" in Pullach in grossen Schritten hinaufsteigen; die ausholenden

schwingenden Schritte und die straffe, aber nicht steife Haltung erinnern daran, dass er als Offizier ein passionierter Reiter war.

Auffallend die grossen blauen Augen; sie faszinieren den Besucher, sprechen den Gesprächspartner an, binden ggf. den Untergebenen, lassen den Widersacher starke Willenskraft spüren.

Die Ohren gut geformt, aber leicht abstehend, das graublond Haar schütter, dichte Augenbrauen, einen Oberlippenbart über einem Mund, der eher voll als asketisch ist.

Seine Kleidung gediegen; meist bevorzugt er bräunliche Anzüge mit Weste, unauffällig und ohne Eleganz. Geschmack ist nicht seine Stärke - auch unter der Maxime, dass sich darüber ja nicht streiten lässt. Seine Bedürfnislosigkeit zeigt sich in der gesamten Lebenshaltung: Tee (ohne Blätter!) und Rührei sind die tägliche Büronahrung; davon könne er zufrieden leben.

Dennoch war er kein Kostverächter, liebte einen guten Wein und genoss nach einem Essen in der Männerrunde eine gute Zigarre, die er mit sichtlichem Behagen aufbereitete und mit kleinen puffenden Zügen in Gang setzte. Was er haben wollte, das leistete er sich auch.

Charmant und einführend konnte er Damen faszinieren, wenn die "chemistry" stimmte - aber er besass keine Gewandtheit im Umgang mit ihm nicht vertrauten Menschen, noch die Gabe zum "small talk".
Überhaupt war er gar nicht "gesellschaftlich", noch besass er die Bonhomie, die z.B. Allan Dulles auszeichnete und ihn mit seinem dröhnenden Lachen zum Mittelpunkt einer Runde machte.

Zurückhaltend, fast schüchtern, wirkte er vor allem in ernst-sachlichem Gespräch im kleinen Kreis.

Die Leichtigkeit angelsächsischen Humors war ihm nicht gegeben. Unter vertrauten Mitarbeitern konnte er jedoch fröhlich und gelöst aus sich herausgehen. Unvergessen die ausführlichen Kaffeerunden in seinem Büro, wo wir gänzlich ungezwungen auf Sofa, Sesseln, Armlehnen und Stühlen verteilt oft lange zusammensassen: die Sekretärinnen und die wenigen Mitarbeiter, gelegentlich sein im technischen Bereich jobbender Sohn Christoph, der mit einem köstlichen trockenen Humor gesegnet, seinen Vater zu anekdotischen Militärgeschichten animierte. Zeit, Zeitgefühl spielte keine Rolle.

Ja, die Sekretärinnen: sie hatten es gut bei ihm, und die jungen, hübschen und unendlich einsatzbereiten Wesen dienten ihm und seiner Aufgabe mit Hingabe.

Väterlich nahm er sich menschlicher Probleme an; diskret, hilfsbereit; geduldig führte er oft - und zur Verzweiflung seiner männlichen Mitarbeiter, denen die Erledigung der Arbeit unter den Nägeln brannte - lange seelsorgerische Gespräche mit den Menschen seines weiten Verantwortungsbereiches, die seinen Rat suchten oder der menschlichen Führung bedurften.

Er lebte für seine Aufgabe, für seinen Dienst, souverän über seine Zeit bestimmend - und auch die seiner Mitarbeiter. Dienst und Privatleben waren identisch, Trennlinien verwischten sich. Dass alle anderen, einschliesslich seiner Familie, "fremd-bestimmt" waren, verdross ihn nicht und wurde ihm auch nicht verübelt: er hatte eine Art, den "Mitarbeiter" - keine zufällige Bezeichnung - zu motivieren und unglücklich

wartende Ehefrauen durch einen Anruf zu später Stunde in die gemeinschaftliche Aufgabe einzubinden.

Koffer voller Akten nahm er abends mit nach Hause - oder liess sie nach einem gemütlichen Teeplausch mit meiner Frau und mir bei uns in der Wohnung über Nacht; immer begleitet von Bubi, seinem treuen Fahrer. Häufig kamen die in sein Haus am Starnberger See verfrachteten Koffer unerledigt wieder zurück, kein Wunder, denn erst abends so zwischen 21 und 22 Uhr pflegte er zum Aufbruch zu blasen. So wie zu dem meist um Stunden verspäteten Mittagessen kündigte er dies mit "werbender" Stimme und einem amüsiert-fröhlichen Unterton seinem Stab über die Telefonsprechanlage (sie fiel leider später der Sicherheit zum Opfer) an.

Wenn der Arbeitsdrang es erlaubte, legte er einen Mittagsschlaf ein, der gegen 15 Uhr begann und erst nach 17 Uhr endete. Der volle Betrieb lief natürlich weiter und der Abend wurde noch später.....

Das Gefühl, gemeinschaftlich an einer wichtigen, hochinteressanten Aufgabe mitzuwirken und einer aussergewöhnlichen Persönlichkeit und einem fürsorglichen Menschen zur Seite zu stehen, erzeugte eine Atmosphäre von Zufriedenheit und Erfüllung, wie man sie in späteren Jahren im grösseren Kreise nicht mehr erleben konnte.

Mich erinnerte damals Gehlen, als einige Rückschläge uns alle trafen, an den bedeutenden Konstrukteur und Autokönig Borgward: souverän, grosser Wurf, aber dann eben auch die Eigenwilligkeit, die teuer zu stehen kam.

Ohne sein grosses Pflichtgefühl und den eisernen Willen zur Durchsetzung und Behauptung seines Konzepts (eines integrierten, alle

Bereiche geheimdienstlicher Beschaffung und nachrichtendienstlicher Auswertung umfassenden Auslands-ND) wäre Gehlen ein homo ludens par excellence gewesen: Neigungen folgend, technischen Innovationen nachgehend; ein "gadgeteer" und passionierter Dilettant auf medizinischem und naturwissenschaftlichem Gebiet; angewandte Psychologie hatte es ihm angetan, einschlägige medizinische Fachzeitschriften dienten der Entspannung.

Seine Familie galt ihm viel, sei es die betuliche, immerwährende Fürsorge seiner Frau oder seien es die Wünsche und Erfordernisse seiner Kinder. Spät nachts holte er, alleinfahrend, Töchter vom Tanzen o.ä. ab; immer standen Hilfe und liebevolle, grosszügige Unterstützung bereit.

Sein Sohn und seine drei Töchter dankten es ihm durch grosse Zuneigung. Frau und Kinder ehren sein Andenken.

Auf ganz persönlicher Basis gab er in seinem rustikalen Holzhaus am Starnberger See (was ihn zum Segler werden liess) mal eine Einladung - nie "Gesellschaften"; vielleicht war dies ein Manko, besonders in den unpersönlicher werdenden Zeiten, die nach den ersten zehn Pullacher Jahren der "Grossfamilie" folgten.

Die fünfziger Jahre waren atmosphärisch wohl einmalig und nie wiederholbar - wie auch die Jahre des "etablierten" und gefestigten Dienstes für Gehlen und viele seiner Mitarbeiter die glücklichsten waren. "Früh- und Feudalzeit" pflegte ich diesen Abschnitt zu apostrophieren, eine benevolente, arbeitsintensive und aufbauende Periode in der Geschichte des Dienstes.

Erst schrittweise setzten die Ordnungsprinzipien bundesdeutscher Provenienz der selbstgesetzten diensteigenen administrativen Ordnung ein Ende. Die Souveränität in der Handhabung dieses diensteigenen Regelwerks - es war durchaus akribisch und den Erfordernissen eines Nachrichtendienstes untergeordnet, etwa wie im britischen Dienst - musste wohl zwangsläufig dem Zuschnitt auf eine Behörde weichen - aber Gehlen tat sich damit sehr schwer. Und vieles wurde in der Präponderanz allgemein gültiger haushaltsrechtlicher Bestimmungen, unbeschadet der speziellen Bedürfnisse eines Nachrichtendienstes, für diesen zum Prokrustesbett.

Vielleicht hätte die Führung des Dienstes mehr Flexibilität, einen weiteren Ermessensspielraum durchsetzen können, wenn sich in Bonn das Primat des Politischen, die Gestaltungskraft des Politikers gegenüber der administrativen Macht der Apparate verwirklicht hätte. So kam es beim Aufbau dieser unserer Republik ganz anders - eine ungute Gewichtsverlagerung in der Führung der Staatsgeschäfte, welche sich z.B. in der Bevormundung durch das zivile-administrative Element beim Aufbau der Streitkräfte demotivierend auswirkte.

Vielleicht war das Ganze nur ein gravierender Irrtum, ein Missverständnis unserer Adepten: p o l i t i s c h e Kontrolle ist bei den Angelsachsen die "c i v i l c o n t r o l", d.h. die unbestreitbare politische Verantwortung von Parlament-Regierung-Gerichten; wir machten aus "civil" die Geschäftsführung durch Zivilisten, vertreten in der Obersten Bürokratie. (Vergeblich hatte Gehlen darum gekämpft, eine Oberste Bundesbehörde zu werden.....).

Es musste nun auch so gehen - aber der administrative Aufwand

wurde immer grösser, die Kosten-Nutzen-Relation nahm zugunsten einer Gleichbehandlung und der ihr innewohnenden Perfektionierung ab. Allmählich änderte sich die Mentalität der Mitarbeiter hin zu einer Behörde. (Ein von mir gern benutztes Zitat: "Inspektoren regieren die Welt, Oberinspektoren leiten sie hierzu an"). Statt der Bewältigung der Aufgabe war man bestrebt, die Dienstgeschäfte zu erledigen - mehr oder weniger sorgfältig, aber auf jeden Fall in der gesetzlich allgemein gültig geregelten Arbeitszeit. Das Ende kam mit der Stechuhr: das vorgeschriebene Zeitmass wurde verlangt, und das stand im Vordergrund. Aber da war "der Dr." schon im Ruhestand.

Die Zwei-Klassengesellschaft formierte sich: die Masse der geregelten, die Wenigen, die aufgrund höherer Verantwortung, aber ohne Kompensation, die Mehrlast doppelt für viele, und dies meist ohne Hilfskräfte, tragen. Welch ein psychologischer Niedergang von souveräner Hingabe zu zeitmass-abhängiger "Dienstleistung".

Gehlen konnte diesen allgemeinen Wandel nicht verhindern - kaum aufhalten. Und das brachte ihm viel Kummer, zumal er den Widerpart dieser ihm durch die allgemeine Entwicklung aufgezwungenen Rückzugsgefechte personifizierte, d.h. sich mit den - im Grunde in anonymer Pflichterfüllung vorwärtsdrängenden - Bonner Beamten festzog. Der Sache war das nicht dienlich, und konspirative Theorien führten zu nichts, verdichteten das beiderseitige Misstrauen. "Sie sind der einzige, der mich nicht ansieht", sagte mir Guido Hertel, der Präsident des Bundesrechnungshofes, und gab seiner Genugtuung Ausdruck, als ich bei der Vertretung des "Instituts der mitarbeitenden Ehefrauen" einen Einzelfall von Vettern-Wirtschaft zugab. (Wir

konnten diese sicherheitlich und psychologisch (Belastung der Familie durch Geheimhaltung usw.) so nutzbringende Praxis dann beibehalten.)

Gehlen zog sich zunehmend aus diesem Teil der Geschäfte zurück, überliess Aufgabe und Ärger dem gelassen operierenden, ihm loyal zugetanen General Wendtland.

Aber auch seine Präsenz in Bonn liess nach - Fremdbestimmung mit Lobbyismus zu begegnen fiel ihm schwer. So führte er eher reaktiv, aus der Hinterhand, sich auf diejenigen politischen Felder beschränkend, deren Beobachtung und analytische Beurteilung ihn faszinierten: der Ost-West-Gegensatz, die Bündnispolitik unter besonderer Beachtung der Entwicklungen und Strömungen in den USA, die europäische Einigung durch Pflege seiner bilateralen Beziehungen.

Es war die Zeit meist sorgenvoller Gespräche mit seinen "Sonderverbindungen". Hierunter gab es auch solch faszinierende Persönlichkeiten wie Jay Lovestone - der vom Kommunismus zur Rechten gewandelte politische Berater Meany's, oder Klaus Dohrn, auch ein Konvertit, ein Mann von grosser Bildung und Erfahrung und mit vertrauten Gesprächspartnern in allen wichtigen Hauptstädten. Tendenziell verstärkten diese Gespräche Gehlen's Neigung, die westlichen Schwächen und die sowjetischen Stärken überzubewerten.

Es kam die Entwicklung hin zu einer aktiven Ostpolitik Bonn's. Mit Adenauer hätte ihn das fasziniert; so machte ihm das Vorwärtsdrängen von Schröder Sorge und erfüllte die Kulmination mit Brandt ihn mit Misstrauen. Leider war damals die von beiderseitiger patriotischer Gesinnung und Freude an konspirativer

Denkungsweise angeregte Beziehung zur SPD in der Person Erler's zu Ende gegangen - zum Schaden der Sache.

Die personalpolitischen und sachlichen Folgen dieser Entfremdung zur Opposition sollte der Dienst später zu tragen haben, und es sollte Jahre dauern, bis an die alte Beziehung wieder angeknüpft werden konnte. -

Das abwertend und hämisch gemeinte Wort von Oberst Heinz - er gehörte Anfang der 50iger Jahre zu den konzeptionellen Gegnern -, dass Gehlen das Produkt einer Schäferstunde von Ludendorff und Mata Hari sei, fand ich schon damals ganz witzig und bewerte es auch heute als eine pointierte Kennzeichnung, wenn man es der offensichtlich böartigen Absicht entkleidet. Gehlen hatte viel von beiden Elementen: der Analytiker, Generalstäbler, die zur Führung berufene Persönlichkeit - aber auch der von der Welt der Konspiration und politischen Intrige faszinierte Entdecker. Er hätte auch - ohne dass man ihn deshalb mystifizieren sollte, denn au fonds war er sehr bürgerlich - der Serenissima dienen können.

Konspiration und Analyse, politische Intrige und Freude am (Schach) Spiel bewegten ihn, als er die Fühlungnahme und Gespräche des Obersten von Bonin mit den Sowjets - oder eigentlich den Russen - aus dem Hintergrund beeinflusste. Es konnte damals letzten Endes nichts im westlich-deutschen Sinne bewirken - aber im Umbruch von Stalin über Malenkov zu Bulganin/Chruschtschew war Vieles in Bewegung geraten, und Gehlen wollte in unserem Interesse mitmischen, am Verwirrspiel teilhaben.

Bei einer anderen Gelegenheit sprach ich von den Ähnlichkeiten im Verhaltensmuster zwischen Gehlen und General de Gaulle: beide in machtpolitischer/materieller Abhängigkeit, beide vom patriotischen Geist durchdrungen, beide ausgerichtet auf die nationale Souveränität.

Ihr Verhalten gegenüber dem Grossen Bruder, die Affronts und politischen Alleingänge zeigen viele Parallelen. Bei de Gaulle mit Hilfe der Öffentlichkeit, Gehlen eher subkutan. (Viele Briefe wurden von ihm geschrieben, aber dann nicht abgeschickt, but he got it out of his system!).

Beide machten sich durch ihre gezielte Unbequemlichkeit nicht beliebt - bei de Gaulle, man denke nur an Roosevelts Ablehnung, war dies allerdings wesentlich ausgeprägter - aber beide liessen sich an Bündnistreue und Loyalität in wirklichen Krisensituationen von niemandem übertreffen. Und beide gaben freiwillig doppelt, wo sie sich in psychologischer Abhängigkeit verweigert hatten.

Es verdient besonders gewürdigt zu werden, dass die jeweiligen "mächtigeren" Partner bemerkenswertes Verständnis für die Bedrückungen des anderen zeigten.

Übrigens hat Gehlen immer wieder bewiesen, dass er sich auch in der Position des "Mächtigeren" entsprechend zu verhalten wusste: einmal, als es um die Schaffung einer russischen Gegenbewegung ging und er den Aufbau der Wlassow-Armee forcierte (was bekanntlich an Hitler's fanatischer Borniertheit scheiterte und ein trauriges Ende nahm), später wiederholt, als es darum ging, mit wesentlich kleineren und weniger potenten ausländischen Nachrichtendiensten zu kooperieren.

Stets stand für ihn die politische Qualität im Vordergrund,

nichts war Gehlen fremder, als ein do ut des nach buchhalterischen Masstäben zu praktizieren.

Wie ja die politische Zielrichtung und Qualität sein Tun und Planen beherrschte. Dass er sich für den "Feld-Wald- und Wiesen-ND" so wenig interessierte, überhaupt konventionellen Abläufen und "laufenden Geschäften" eher abhold war, musste so manch engagierter Mitarbeiter, erst recht natürlich die ND-Funktionäre, schmerzlich empfinden. Umso grösser war die Eigenverantwortung der von ihm eingesetzten Vorgesetzten. Dass daraus keine "Erbhöfe" wurden, verhinderte er durch die Aufteilung eigentlich zusammenhängender Aufgaben: ein höherer Aufwand, der durch das Mehr an Wettbewerb nicht kompensiert wurde.

Daraus folgerte, dass er jemand brauchte, um die erheblichen Lücken in der Führung zu schliessen. Einem noch so fähigen Vize hätte er das ungern überlassen, aber einem Jüngeren - dem er voll vertrauen konnte - öffnete sich dadurch ein weites Feld für Koordination und Steuerung.

Dieser unauffällige, zurückhaltende, zu jedem Gepränge, jeder Pose und Selbstdarstellung in Auftreten und Verhalten unfähige Mann besass eine stillwirkende Autorität. Krisenzeiten meisterte er nicht nur aufgrund seines politischen Instinkts und seinem Festhalten an seinen Zielsetzungen, sondern auch infolge dieser unbestrittenen autoritas. Sie bestand nicht nur im eigenen Bereich - und blieb trotz mancher ernster Kritik bis zum Schluss unangefochten -, sondern brachte ihm auch Ansehen und Gewicht bei Persönlichkeiten, die in keinem Abhängigkeits-

verhältnis standen. Ich erinnere mich an Gesprächsrunden mit Generalen, die im Kriege seine Vorgesetzten waren bzw. rangmässig über ihm gestanden hatten, oder an Persönlichkeiten aus Industrie und Wirtschaft: es war zu sehen, wie sich die Gewichte verlagerten, wie anfänglich Gehlen eher unscheinbar wirkte, dann aber zunehmend die Runde dominierte - wie anfänglich "praepotente" Bosse zunehmend eine Haltung voll aufmerksamen Respekts einnahmen. Es war immer wieder ein faszinierendes Erlebnis. -

Es blieb ein Phänomen, dass ihn diese Gaben und Eigenschaften gegenüber dem anonymen, stetigen Mühlstein der meist apolitischen Regierungsbeamtenschaft im Stich liessen. In Sonderheit war es seine lautlose Art der "Kampfführung", die an diesen weiterrollenden Gewichten abprallte: Seine Autorität war durch die Dienstvorschriften und administrativen Gebote auf Vollzugspflichten reduziert, sein politisches Gewicht auf Berichtspflicht relativiert. Seine tiefsitzende Achtungspflicht gegenüber der Autorität der Staatsführung verunsicherte ihn in diesem Tauziehen und unterhöhlte sein Selbstbewusstsein.

Trotz des akademisch-bürgerlichen Hintergrundes seiner Familie und trotz seines zivilen Phaenotypus war Gehlen in Gesinnung und Haltung Soldat, fritzisch gesinnt, ein vom Schlesiertum geprägter Preusse. Unbeschadet grosser Bewunderung für die Kurie und Freude an seinem hohen Malteserorden blieb er im Wesen nüchtern und protestantisch. In der Begegnung als Abhängiger mit der rheinländisch-klerikalen, so gänzlich amilitärischen Welt des neuen Staatsapparates fühlte er sich nicht zuhause. Gewohnt, wohlwollend-fürsorgliche militärische Vorgesetzte zu haben, durch das Geschick vor eine besondere

Aufgabe gestellt, seine Fähigkeiten bei der Durchsetzung seiner Zielvorstellungen erfolgreich erprobt, war er nun, am Ende seines Berufslebens gerade dort, wohin er mit seinem Werk heimkehrte, zum Fremden geworden. -

In der Zurückgezogenheit seines Ruhestandes, inmitten seiner Familie, verbunden mit treuen Freunden, weit angesehen im In- und im Ausland, konnte er auf eine aussergewöhnliche Lebensleistung zurückblicken. Er hat sich um Deutschland verdient gemacht.

Eberhard P. Blum

"General Gehlen and the Americans"
as viewed by a German Participant

Speech delivered May 10th, 1991

at The American Institute for

Contemporary German Studies,

The Johns Hopkins University.

1. There are several reasons why I gladly followed your invitation to participate at this presentation and discussion and to comment on Mary Ellen Reese's book:

first and foremost it is the expression of my deep attachment to the relationship with the United States, and to what our alliance stands for.

second I would like to show my friendship to my American friends with whom our partnership developed through these early years, at the very beginning of our alliance.

As time goes by some of the closest friends have left us.

With Tom Lucid and John Bross I shared an experience unique both professionally and in our private lives.

third it gives me an opportunity to state in a distinguished circle -- and publicly -- my immense satisfaction to have participated in this joint venture. We were present at the creation of the American-German-Partnership which has matured in sun and wind.

In conveying these thoughts to you I would like to stress that 45 years ago something has been started of which you Americans can pride yourself: turning an enemy -- and a thoroughly beaten one -- into an ally, developing a democratic canvas within a totally destroyed and hitherto totalitarian structured country, enhancing the security of the West, laying the groundwork for a lasting alliance.

The Org Gehlen was a part of these first and formative steps: it spearheaded the future close relationship in the security

and military field.

2. The publication of Mary Ellen Reese's book and the growing interest in revelations about this period show that the time has come to appreciate that those gentlemen on either side who were instrumental in bringing all that about have not only contributed to a remarkable success-story, the Americans involved have actually taken responsibilities far beyond their positions and authority

Men can prove themselves, respond to the challenges, if the horizon is open and the ground untreaden (something by the way, cavalry officers have been educated to cope with!) Such was the situation in the late forties.

For any historian it is a rarely achieved endeavour to catch the "Zeitgeist" and the mixture of motivations of the dramatis personae even if less than two generations ago. Mostly one has to confine oneself to factual, written, material and to follow traces which are sometimes leading into accidental directions.

40 years: far enough receded for simplifications and established opinions having taken hold; still too close not to have witnesses, even participants, around with all their varying points of view complicating the picture.

Apropos the "Zeitgeist": how revealing that Russian historians, inspired by Glasnost, put the unleashing of the Cold War squarely on Stalin's shoulders: he thus provoked the reaction by the West, eventually leading to the selfdefeating competition the outcome of which we have witnessed.

A belated justification for our so called Cold Warriors!

Remember those arguments? But neither the allegations about an "exaggerated Soviet Threat" by Gehlen and his men nor the excuses offered about the "unfortunate political-tactical errors by Stalin", nor even the appreciation of a "deep-rooted Russian urge for security" could explain the facts away: it was a continuing aggressive military build-up, just that!

(It is tempting - but should be left to another occasion - to analyse the socio-political threads and patterns emerging in postwar Germany and to explore the various and differing approaches of the Allies towards the groupings of the political spectrum.

Oddly enough - but maybe not so unusual - some of these circles onto whom the Americans made a special effort or felt a stronger affinity turned out in later years to be the most critical, even breeding anti-Americanism)

Within these pitfalls between different and controversial opinions along the road to "objectivity" Mary Ellen Reese has tread with considerable skill not only in her factual research, but - and that I value even higher - in her grasp of people and motives. Her feeling for the historic environment - reaching out well beyond the easy cliches, finding her way through the maze of interlocking events, of individual or collective axes to grind, of prejudices and distortions - is truly remarkable. (The latter is f.i. evident in the Zolling/Höhne book "The General was a Spy" which first appeared in the German magazine "Der Spiegel" as a serial at a time of intense political infighting following the end of the Adenauer- and the beginning of the Brandt-Era. The picture given of Gehlen is heavily biased because of obvious political motives.)

And almost two decades earlier -- as Mary Ellen's thorough research reveals -- there existed a widespread resentment within the American military, foremost the CIC, towards the emerging political role of the CIA and a strong distrust of this "semi-independent" German Organization. (Of CIC's clandestine operation CAMPUS we only heard many years later. Cooperation could have prevented a lot of damage!). Add to all these aspects the prevailing tendency for revisionism -- looking at the past with standards of the present -- and you can value what Mary Ellen has achieved. Her book makes fascinating reading -- not often found in books about this genre.

3. My contribution in describing these formative years could be to offer some reflexions from my personal point de vue, thus hoping to complete the picture by letting a German participant speak. This is not "the other side of the coin" because we were on the same side, its rather a complementary view -- something I believe should have been included in the first place. --

In doing so I will confine myself to the essentials. --

The people who joined Gehlen at the inception were of a homogenous background, and- remarkably so: men and women, both the higher echelons and the secretary-level, had their roots in what we might call upper-middle-class-families of mostly traditional upbringing. The military career was a natural choice; it had put them apart from the Nazi-Party at whose functionaries they looked with disdain.

Many deceived themselves up to the bitter end - like, by the way, a majority of those in the population who were critical of the Nazi-regime - by making a difference between Hitler on the one side and his Myrmidones. - This was a view shared by many foreign politicians of the time, a tendency often found in analogue constellations up to this day.

General von Seeckt's beneficiary order, prohibiting any membership in the political parties of the Weimar Republic, was upheld throughout Hitler's reign (up to the failed coup of 1944) - thus putting an agreeable distance between the Army and the Nazi-Party (a fundamental difference - this should be noted - to the Communist practice).

Many of us younger officers had made their professional choice because the military was the only meaningful career where a party-membership and -involvement was even forbidden, whilst as a lawyer, public servant, in the academic professions (except, may be, medicine), even in free enterprise, party-membership could not be easily avoided; and it came in handy for the career. Anyway, after long hours of soul-searching with my parents I decided to make my career in the Army and so became a cavalry officer. Looking back, I realize, that this life, the Esprit de Corps in the regiment, away in the war and all the years at the front made us live in a sort of National Park - in this case protected from the Wildlife o u t s i d e our world!

This explains, I think, the fact that the decision to eliminate the political leadership - not heard of in German history - could only emerge from those officers, who by their personal

experience or their position and insight were confronted with the recklessness and criminality of the Dictator himself.

After failing in their plan of 1938 to arrest Hitler and bring him to court (!), later, in the total effort of an all-out-war only a few had the daring spirit that the only solution was to kill the Head of State. Some of the best among them had to overcome their deeprooted belief in the holiness of their oath, which by long tradition tied them to the person at the top. The "Tyrannenmord" has been an exceptional and rare event throughout history; the very few who crossed the threshold - be ready to stand up and die - were heroes, but in their general set of mind they were not different from those who stayed behind or happened to be outside of the inner circle. All these rather unique conditions have to be kept in mind in assessing the range of men and women gathering in Gehlen's Organization during these early years. -

There was a second common denominator: the awareness of the Threat of Communism as the driving force of the expansionist Soviet System. The roots of this deeply engraved belief went back to the fratricide days of the Weimar Republic; it had been an important factor in bringing the bourgeois majority into Hitler's camp.

Now, half of Germany was either lost or occupied by the Russian Army, the bordering states conquered and raped, the danger of a new war in Middle Europe was very present. The rapid withdrawal of the Allied troops after the hostilities - traditional pattern of Empires beyond the Sea - ended

without resolving status and future of the states bordering the Soviet Union? certainly a costly mistake. -
For many of us it was no time to sit idly by.

Churchill wrote at a later date that by May 1945 he himself (like Montgomery) had considered rearming the German troops. At the same time Bedell Smith bade farewell to Sir Kenneth Strong stipulating to the latter's astonishment that the future main partner to cooperate with would now be the Soviets! He quickly learned.

Still, hadn't Gehlen succeeded in establishing this very balanced and special partnership - maybe not a "Magna Charta", yet the accepted and respected "Common Law" of the relationship - he wouldn't have won over and kept the support of so many qualified people. I remember clearly that those principles - called the Gentlemen Agreement - were decisive for our readiness to join the common effort. It had great appeal to join the side to which we belonged historically, in culture and religion, and in doing so to act in the national interest years before any German Government was eventually coming about. Therefore Gehlen's visiting of Adenauer and Schumacher in 1949 f.i. became very important to us: in agreeing, Chancellor and Leader of the Opposition both conveyed national authority and the above - party - status of the Organization.

4. There was a strong streak of patriotism and sense of history in Gehlen reminding me at several occasions of De Gaulle. Like the French statesman Gehlen struggled hard for his

moral and political independence - as perceived by him.

As with De Gaulle a lot of people didn't like it. Only a few understood the motives - their "Fingerspitzengefühl" is much to be commended. Gehlen valued that, the longer the more, even if he didn't admit it. -

Like de Gaulle there was on the other hand no wavering in matters of principle, of loyalty to the American partner and Ally (remember Berlin and Cuba!). -

Both, de Gaulle and Gehlen, mastered political tactics without being opportunists - a rare combination. Both shared or contributed with their Ally in an uninhibited way when independent, where they would have been difficult and defensive during the uneasy period of dependency! (Example: raw-reports forwarded directly from the collection - called "EBER"-Meldungen).

At this early stage we were also fascinated by the evolvement of Gehlen's vision, the integrated concept of one national intelligence service, uniting evaluation and collection and putting all means of collection under one responsibility. This unified structure emerged out of bitter experiences during the war: the total mess of the intelligence effort within the competing civilian-military-party-structure of the Third Reich!

Under the American trusteeship he really succeeded in combining the missions of the Abwehr, of FHO plus Frontaufklärung and of the Fernmeldeaufklärung - their functions as well as their personnel.

As I used to say: Admiral Canaris, General Fellgiebel (both

victims of the plot!) and Gehlen himself were the Godfathers of the Organization. The impeccable reputation of Canaris influenced many a soldier to join this successor-organization.

Next to our early contribution to Western Security in dangerous times this concept of an integrated service is Gehlen's greatest achievement. His determination to carry it through explains many animosities and critical inner-political situations he had to cope with, up to and well into the final wholesale takeover - (friendly by the way) - of his Organization.

5. Most unfortunately, with the too hasty buildup of the networks, there have been Nazis creeping in from the sidelines, either through neglect or through sheer expediency.

This dark chapter takes on a dominant role in the second part of the book. As a matter of fact all western Intelligence or Security groups sinned in this direction - but we, as a German organization, we carried the burden of our past and should have - after the damage was done - ridden ourselves sooner and more decisively from those figures with a shady - in some cases criminal - past. Mostly, these people were at the fringes or around the Counter Intelligence effort, some were experts about the Balkans and active in the very special Austrian "Theatre of Spying". (Gehlen had become victim to his much cherished "compartmentation system".)

The one in Headquarters, Heinz Felfe, delivered a heavy blow to Gehlen personally and caused a lot of damage in the BND's East German network.

Could the entry of such a controversial sleazy character have been avoided? Only a total ban of former members to the RSHA - whether cleared by denazification-courts or not - could have prevented also smaller fry such as Felte - he had been a police officer by career and received the usual GESTAPO-rank - from entering the Organization. But may be in his case there would have been a waiver since he had before served the British without reproach!

No excuse but an explanation: among Gehlen and his officers there were very few with experience and expertise in the CI/CE-field, both becoming so important in this postwar-period. The one's who had it where in the RSHA and its affiliated organizations. Later, with German Security Agencies in the Federal, State and Military areas firmly established, the own CI/CE-effort shrank to the necessary minimum of the proper needs of the Service.

Another blow to Gehlen was the ugly experience of the Spiegel-affair. It received highest publicity and caused innerpolitical turmoil. But little is known that the BND and his officers were totally exonerated: the informer to the Spiegel was somebody else, our man, a colonel, became a general after some water had flown down the Elbe river!

6. From my experience and perspective I have to say that these setbacks were a burden Gehlen had to carry - but it certainly was not the end of the BND nor of its leader. The integrated concept - evaluation, humint, elint, comint and the national code authority - proved itself and was not

challenged any more; it became the envy of many a foreign service. In the mid-fifties, the BND had become a key-member of the tightly woven - strictly bilateral - canvas of Western Intelligence; he broadened the approach both topical and geographical and was a most useful instrument for Germany's relations to the Third World.-

It served the BND well that the FRG as a medium power had no need for "active measures". Gehlen himself was strictly opposed to clandestine subversive operations if not as the integrated part of a political, may be military, action planned and executed by the government. He thought it irresponsible to induce people to activities which could only lead to their destruction.

7. To sum it up: The creation of a German Intelligence Service, its important role in alerting and informing the fledgling Alliance about the Soviet Military Threat, the political aspect of the growing relationship, the capital of trust developed throughout decades past and towards challenges to come - what came out of the CIA-Gehlen-Connection is a success-story.

As a German participating at an early hour I look back with gratitude to our American friends; their political understanding and tact and their willingness to carry an often heavy responsibility has to be valued very highly indeed.

It's a past we share!

As Robert Stevenson put it:

The future is nothing, but the past
is myself, my own history, the seed
of my present thoughts, the mould
of my present disposition.

I will remember General Gehlen in a very personal way:
his foresight, dedication and perseverance have become
part of our history.